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Early Retirement and Employment 
of the Young in the Netherlands
Arie Kapteyn, Klaas de Vos, and Adriaan Kalwij
8.1    Introduction
Previous papers on the National Bureau of Economic Research Interna-
tional Social Security Project focused on the incentives to retire, the eﬀects of 
possible reforms, and the well- being of the elderly. In this chapter, we return 
to one of the factors underlying the emergence of widespread early retire-
ment opportunities: the desire to create or preserve jobs for the young. When 
early retirement was ﬁ  rst proposed in the late seventies in the Netherlands, 
unemployment soared, and the idea was that by sending elderly workers into 
early retirement, younger workers would be able to keep their jobs. Early 
retirement was considered to be a win-  win solution: the elderly who had 
worked hard during the reconstruction period after World War II could take 
up a well- deserved early retirement pension, while the young who were at risk 
of becoming a “lost generation” could take their places in the labor market. 
The ﬁ  rst trade union plan (1975) proposing early retirement was in fact 
called “Jong voor Oud” (“Young for Old”). Next to the introduction of early 
retirement programs for elderly workers in most sectors in the late seventies 
and early eighties, employers and trade unions also colluded to send older 
workers into disability or unemployment, with employers often supplement-
ing the already generous statutory beneﬁ  ts until the social security eligibility 
age (and mandatory retirement age) of sixty-  ﬁ  ve was reached.
All in all, the labor force participation (LFP) of the (male) elderly shows a 
considerable decrease between the late seventies and late nineties, after which 
most early retirement programs were scaled down because they were fast 
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becoming ﬁ  nancially unsustainable, and the government ﬁ  nally appeared 
to succeed in eﬀectively restricting access to unemployment and disability 
beneﬁ  ts.
In this chapter, we try to answer the question, did early retirement of the 
elderly from the labor force (be it via early retirement programs or alternative 
routes such as disability and unemployment beneﬁ  ts) indeed create jobs for 
the young? We start by providing a brief history of the main beneﬁ  t schemes 
related to retirement: early retirement, disability, social security, and occu-
pational pensions. Next, we present some graphical evidence on the relation-
ship between employment and unemployment of the young and labor force 
participation of the old. After that, we present regressions explaining labor 
market status of the young as a function employment of elderly. Next, we 
investigate the time series properties of these variables and of a few indica-
tors of retirement incentives. We will ﬁ  nd that the incentive indicators we 
have constructed are plausibly caused by the employment of the young, 
conﬁ  rming the view that these incentives were indeed introduced to alleviate 
the youth unemployment problem. It also implies that these variables can-
not be used as instruments in regressions to explain youth employment as a 
function of employment of the elderly. However, we will ﬁ  nd variables that 
do seem to be predetermined for labor force participation of the elderly. This 
allows us to estimate the eﬀect of labor force participation of the elderly on 
employment of younger age groups in the labor markets, using instrumen-
tal variables. Generally, the relations we obtain suggest complementarity 
between labor force participation of the elderly and employment of the 
younger age groups. Thus, if anything, attempts to reduce unemployment 
via strong incentives for retirement most likely have aggravated the problem 
rather than alleviating it.
8.2      The Early Retirement Debate and Other Exit Routes 
from the Labor Market in the Netherlands
The ﬁ  rst plan for the introduction of early retirement was proposed by a 
board member of the Netherlands Catholic Trade Union, Toon Riemen, in 
1975. Mr. Riemen’s plan was called “Young for Old” and had as its primary 
purpose to reduce youth unemployment.1 The plan aimed to kill two birds 
with one stone. As he put it in a recent interview: “Since the 1973 oil crisis, 
there was a big problem with youth unemployment. At the same time you 
saw elderly employees who were at the end of their tether. Then you start 
brainstorming, can’t we think of a plan to solve that.” The essence of the 
plan was an old person out and a young person in (VPRO 2004).
The Minister of Social Aﬀairs decided to set up a commission that was 
1. The information about the history of the early retirement debate is partly taken from 
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to advise on the merits of the early retirement (ER) plan. The commission, 
headed by a board member of the Unilever pension fund, Van Tets, advised 
against the idea. The commission felt that the plan’s potential for solving 
the youth unemployment problem was illusory. Nevertheless, the Minister 
of Social Aﬀairs, Boersma, decided to start an experiment in two sectors: 
education and construction. As of December 1, 1976, and April 1, 1977, 
respectively, employees in these sectors had the possibility to retire at the 
age of sixty-  three or sixty-  four, instead of the statutory retirement age of 
sixty- ﬁ   ve.
Soon, the ER plans were extended to other sectors. In February 1975, the 
Minister of Social Aﬀairs avoided an impending strike in Rotterdam harbor 
by oﬀering employees an ER plan at the government’s expense.
The ER plans proved to be very popular with both employees and employ-
ers. The ER was ﬁ  nancially very attractive to employees. The before-  tax 
replacement rate usually was on the order of 80 or 90 percent, and since no 
payroll taxes were levied on the retired, the net replacement rate could be 
very close to 100 percent. Moreover, one kept accumulating pension rights 
as if one was still employed.
Employers liked the ER plans because it made it easy to reduce the labor 
force during the economic downturn. Typically, employees would be eligible 
if they had worked for the same company for at least ten years.
In 1980, the ER experiment was codiﬁ  ed into law and in the following 
years was incorporated in many collective agreements.
The ﬁ  nancing of ER was pay-  as-  you-  go. As such, it provided a classic 
example of a transfer between generations. The employed paid for the ER 
of the older generation by means of a special payroll tax, while the retired 
only reaped the beneﬁ  ts.
Not surprisingly, the take-  up of ER was very large. For instance, in the 
ﬁ  rst year more than 50 percent of the age-  eligible construction workers 
decided to retire early, twice as many as anticipated by the government. In 
later years, take-  up got close to 100 percent.
There is some debate about whether the spread of ER has contributed to 
the goal of reducing youth unemployment. The originator of the “Young 
for Old,” Toon Riemen, does not think so: “Nothing is left of the original 
goal” (VPRO 2004).
8.2.1    Disability  Insurance
Even before ER schemes were introduced, employees could retire before 
the standard retirement age of sixty- ﬁ  ve. The most frequently used exit route 
was Disability Insurance (DI). Although various work disability laws had 
been in existence since the early twentieth century, a comprehensive DI law 
was introduced in 1967, covering all employees (but not self-  employed). 
Interestingly, the law passed parliament without any nay vote. Any person 
with a whole of partial work disability was entitled to a beneﬁ  t equal to 80 246        Arie Kapteyn, Klaas de Vos, and Adriaan Kalwij
percent of previous earnings. In after-  tax terms, this might be equivalent to 
90 percent. There was no time limit to the beneﬁ  t period, so in principle, one 
could expect to receive beneﬁ  ts until the statutory retirement age of sixty-
 ﬁ  v e.  M o r e o v e r,  w h i l e  d r aw i n g  D I  b e n e ﬁ  t s ,  o n e  o f t e n  a l s o  k e p t  a c c u m u l a t i n g  
pension rights, while one no longer had to pay the pension premium that 
workers pay.
The number of beneﬁ  ciaries showed an explosive growth, as illustrated 
in ﬁ  gure 8.1. As with the later ER schemes, take-  up was much higher than 
anticipated. The government had estimated that the maximum number of 
DI beneﬁ  ciaries would be 200,000, but in 1976 the number of beneﬁ  ciaries 
had already reached 500,000. As with ER, the scheme was popular among 
both employees and employers. For employees, it was an attractive exit route, 
as may be clear from the description of the ﬁ  nancial aspects of the scheme. 
For employers, the scheme had the advantage of a relatively easy way to 
terminate employees, which under Dutch law would be complicated and 
costly otherwise.
The dramatic increase in the number of DI beneﬁ  ciaries led to obvious 
budgetary problems, which triggered a number of reforms, all aimed at a 
reduction of the DI rolls. In 1985, despite massive protests, the beneﬁ  t was 
reduced from 80 percent of previous earnings to 70 percent. In 1987, DI was 
no longer possible for individuals who were previously (fully or partially) 
unemployed. One can see from ﬁ  gure 8.1 that these changes did not have 
much of a visible eﬀect on the growth of the DI rolls. In 1991, the length of 
the beneﬁ  t period was reduced for persons who at that time were less than 
ﬁ  fty years of age. Figure 8.1 suggests that this may have had some eﬀect on 
the number of DI recipients in later years. In 1998, partial experience rating 
was introduced. In 2004, DI beneﬁ  ciaries younger than ﬁ  fty had to undergo 
strict medical reexaminations. Finally, in 2006, a new DI law replaced the 
old one. Under the new law, during the ﬁ  rst two years after one becomes 
disabled, wages continue to be paid. After two years a determination takes 
place of whether one is permanently disabled for at least 80 percent. In that 
case DI beneﬁ  ts are 75 percent of a worker’s previous wages until the age 
of sixty- ﬁ  ve. Work limitations that are deemed to be less than 35 percent do 
not entitle a worker to DI beneﬁ  ts. Between 35 percent and 80 percent one 
receives a DI beneﬁ  t equal to 70 percent of the earnings loss for a maximum 
period of thirty-  eight months. After that, the beneﬁ  t depends on earnings 
loss and the extent to which one uses the remaining earnings capacity; see, 
for instance, Van Oorschot (2007).
8.2.2    Social  Security
The social security (SS) act was passed in 1957.2 The system was extremely 
simple. Any man or unmarried woman was entitled to a ﬁ  xed amount, in-
2. The information in this section has been derived from SVB (2007).Early Retirement and Employment of the Young in the Netherlands    2 4 7
dependent of work history. Married women were not entitled to their own 
beneﬁ  t. Only in the eighties did the unequal treatment of men and women 
come to an end so that also women had their own independent entitlement 
to an SS beneﬁ  t. As of 1979, the level of beneﬁ  ts is linked to the after-
  tax minimum wage. In later changes, beneﬁ  ts for younger partners of SS 
recipients were introduced. This will now be abolished by 2015. There is no 
earnings test for SS, so one can receive SS while being gainfully employed. 
Figure 8.2 shows the evolution of the level of SS beneﬁ  ts for both married 
and unmarried individuals since 1975. The ﬁ  gure shows steady growth of 
the beneﬁ  t level until about 1979. The fact that after 1979 the beneﬁ  t level 
falls in real terms is due to the linkage with after-  tax minimum wages. The 
after- tax minimum wage also determines the level of welfare beneﬁ  ts. When 
in the early eighties the economy entered into a recession and government 
deﬁ  cits ballooned, the government reacted by cutting the minimum wage, 
welfare beneﬁ  ts, and as a result, also SS beneﬁ  ts. Later ﬂ  uctuations in the 
level of SS beneﬁ  ts mainly reﬂ  ect economic conditions and the state of the 
government budget, which inﬂ  uenced minimum wages, welfare beneﬁ  ts, and 
through the linkage, also SS beneﬁ  ts. Changes in the tax system were another 
important determinant.
8.2.3    Private  Pensions
The bulk of private pensions in the Netherlands consist of occupational 
pensions. Typically, employment for a certain company or in a certain sector 
implies mandatory participation in a pension plan. Pensions tend to be of 
the deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t type with beneﬁ  ts depending on ﬁ  nal pay or average pay. 
Usually, a full pension will amount to 70 percent of either full or average 
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pay if one has contributed for forty years. For each year less, one loses 1.75 
percentage points. Beneﬁ  ts are usually indexed by the wage index. Since the 
early 2000s, many pension schemes have moved from ﬁ  nal pay to average 
pay and wage indexation has become less automatic. In principle pensions 
are portable if one changes jobs. The associated pension liabilities are moved 
from one pension fund to the next.
8.3    Measures  of  Employment
Based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) employment data, we consider the following measures of employ-
ment:
•    LFP and employment (old, ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four) as fraction of total 
population
•    LFP and employment (old ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four, male), as fraction of 
total population
•    LFP and employment (old, ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four, female), as fraction 
of total population
•   Unemployment (young, twenty to twenty-  four), as fraction of total 
population
•   Unemployment (prime age, twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four), as fraction of 
total population
•   LFP and employment (young, twenty to twenty-  four), as fraction of 
total population
•    LFP and employment (prime age, twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four), as fraction 
of total population
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From Statistics Netherlands, we obtain the percentage of persons twenty 
to twenty-  four that are in school. Also from Statistics Netherlands, we use 
data on gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, share of manu-
facturing in the economy, and the statutory minimum wage. Finally, we 
construct two measures of incentives to retire. One is a macroindicator of 
social security wealth and the other one is an indicator of peak value. The 
construction of these two variables is described in the appendix.
For elderly males and females, employment and labor force participation 
are very close. For most of the period under consideration, elderly unem-
ployed were receiving beneﬁ  ts without having the obligation to seek a job. 
This eﬀectively removed them from the labor market.
8.4    Graphical  Evidence
Figures 8.3 through 8.5 show the evolution of the main variables of 
interest between 1971 and 2005. Figure 8.3 shows the LFP of older persons 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four, the LFP of young persons twenty to twenty-  four, 
and the unemployment rate of young persons twenty to twenty- four. Figure 
8.3 presents time series for the LFP of the elderly and the unemployment 
of the two younger age groups (twenty to twenty-  four and twenty-  ﬁ  ve to 
ﬁ  fty-  four) and ﬁ  gure 8.4 presents time series for the LFP of the elderly and 
Fig. 8.3    Labor force participation (old and young) and unemployment (young)Fig. 8.4    Labor force participation (old) and unemployment (young and prime age)
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the two younger age groups. Taken on face value, the graphs do not provide 
much support for the idea that reducing employment of the elderly reduces 
unemployment for the younger age groups. If anything, unemployment of 
the younger age groups seems to go up while the employment of the elderly 
is low. Apart from obvious economic reasons why this may be so (such as 
complementarity of employment of diﬀerent age groups), this may also 
simply be an artifact. If unemployment of all three age groups is correlated, 
and if the elderly unemployed leave the labor market, then we expect the 
pattern shown in ﬁ  gure 8.4.
A complicating factor in studying the relationship between the LFP of 
the elderly and employment and unemployment of the young is the fact 
that the LFP of the elderly males and females shows diﬀerent trends during 
the ﬁ  rst half of the period (1971 to 1987). See ﬁ  gure 8.6. Most likely this 
reﬂ  ects a cohort eﬀect whereby younger cohorts of females exhibit a higher 
LFP than older cohorts. The ﬂ  at curve for female LFP during the ﬁ  rst half 
of the period may therefore be the net result of an increase in the retirement 
hazard (just as for males) and at the same time a larger proportion working 
of younger cohorts. During the second half of the period, both female and 
male LFP are growing, but of course it still remains impossible to say how 
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much of the growth in female LFP is a cohort eﬀect and how much reﬂ  ects 
a lower retirement hazard. Since cohort eﬀects are less likely to play a major 
role in male LFP, we will often concentrate on male LFP among the elderly, 
rather than total elderly LFP.
8.5    Direct  Eﬀect of Elderly LFP on the Young
Before turning to a more systematic exploration of the relation between 
elderly LFP and employment and unemployment of younger age groups, 
we ﬁ  rst consider simple regressions where we regress outcomes for younger 
age groups on elderly LFP.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show the results of a number of regressions in which the 
dependent variable is either employment, unemployment, or the percentage 
in school. We show the coeﬃcients of employment of the elderly; regressions 
are done in levels, in levels with a three-  year lag on elderly employment, 
in ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences, and in ﬁ  ve-  lear log diﬀerences (i.e., of the form: 
ln X[t] – ln X[t – 5]). Moreover, regressions are repeated with and without 
other covariates (which are not reported in the table). The other covariates 
include GDP per capita, the growth in GDP per capita, and the share of 
manufacturing in the economy.
If early retirement of the elderly age group were to have a beneﬁ  cial eﬀect 
on the employment of the younger age group, then the eﬀect of elderly 
employment on employment of younger age groups should be negative, 
while on unemployment it should be positive. When elderly employment 
decreases, employment of the young should increase, while unemployment 
should decrease.
In speciﬁ  cations without other covariates we ﬁ  nd for the young (twenty to 
twenty- four) and the prime aged (twenty- ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty- four) that the eﬀects of 
elderly employment on unemployment are statistically signiﬁ  cant but with 
the “wrong” sign. That is, lower labor force participation of the elderly seems 
to generate higher unemployment of the young. There are various possible 
explanations for this. One explanation is the existence of complementari-
ties between employment of diﬀerent age groups. A second explanation is 
endogeneity of policies: if unemployment soars, policymakers may increase 
incentives for elderly workers to retire. We will return to this possibility 
later.
When regressing employment of the younger age groups, the picture is a 
little more mixed. The eﬀect of employment of the elderly on employment of 
the young tends to be positive or insigniﬁ  cantly negative (in the case where 
we use a three-  year lag).
Once covariates are introduced, more coeﬃcients become insigniﬁ  cant 
and sometimes change sign. In this case, regressions of employment in the 
prime age group on employment of the elderly suggest a potential beneﬁ  -
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 workers, both for employment of the elderly and employment of the elderly 
with a three-  year lag. However, these signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients disappear once 
a trend term is included. In sum, the regressions so far provide little evi-
dence that inducing elderly workers to retire will alleviate unemployment 
of younger age groups.
For good measure, table 8.2 gives the results when we use employment of 
elderly males as an explanatory variable, in an attempt to reduce the possibly 
confounding eﬀects of cohort diﬀerences between age categories. By and 
large the conclusion does not change, with most signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients sug-
gesting complementarity between employment of diﬀerent age groups or 
becoming insigniﬁ  cant once a trend term is included.
It is striking to see that in all speciﬁ  cations elderly employment seems to 
have a negative eﬀect on the proportion of the twenty to twenty-  four age 
group in school. By and large the signs of the various coeﬃcients of the 
school variable are the same as for the unemployment variable. This suggests 
that when job opportunities become scarce, young people are more likely 
to stay in school or to return to school. We also note that when we add a 
number of covariates, and in particular a time trend, many of the coeﬃcients 
become insigniﬁ  cant.
8.6      Causality Tests on Diﬀerenced Variables
Dickey Fuller tests suggest that all variables of interest in the analysis have 
unit roots. Hence, the subsequent analysis is in terms of ﬁ  rst diﬀerenced vari-
ables. Table 8.3 presents an overview of Granger causality tests for the vari-
ous variables of interest.3 We note that the two incentive variables (wbar and 
Wminpv) are Granger caused at least by employment of the young.4 This 
conﬁ  rms the historical description in section 8.2 that worsening employ-
ment of the young was a major factor in creating incentives for the elderly 
to leave the labor force. It also means that regressing youth unemployment 
on the incentive variables cannot reasonably be interpreted in a causal way. 
Employment of elderly males also appears to be Granger caused by youth 
employment.
The GDP per capita does not seem to be Granger caused by any of the 
other variables (although jointly they have a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect). The same 
is true for the percent of twenty to twenty-  four in school (although that is 
Granger caused by GDP per capita). Based on these outcomes, we will use 
lagged values of GDP per capita and of percent of twenty to twenty- four in 
school as instruments in a regression of youth employment (and unemploy-
ment) on employment of the elderly.
3. The maximum number of lags used in the test is equal to two. Model selection criteria for 
choosing the number of lags favored from one to four lags, with relatively minor changes when 
the number of lags increased from two to four.
4. See the appendix for a description of the construction of these variables.Table 8.3  Granger causality tests
Equation   Excluded   chi2   df   Prob  chi2
Employment (youth) School (youth) 28.911 2 0
Employment (prime age) 23.983 2 0
Employment (elderly males) 2.9919 2 0.224
Minimum wage 7.6467 2 0.022
GDP per capita 2.2315 2 0.328
Wbar 10.709 2 0.005
Wminpv 5.6097 2 0.061
All 71.332 14 0
School (youth) Employment (youth) 3.2844 2 0.194
Employment (prime age) 5.8738 2 0.053
Employment (elderly males) 1.806 2 0.405
Minimum wage 3.8917 2 0.143
GDP per capita 11.046 2 0.004
Wbar 0.9598 2 0.619
Wminpv 1.8559 2 0.395
All 21.294 14 0.094
Employment (prime age) Employment (youth) 62.752 2 0
School (youth) 43.08 2 0
Employment (elderly males) 16.301 2 0
Minimum wage 16.97 2 0
GDP per capita 9.0657 2 0.011
Wbar 17.017 2 0
Wminpv 5.3358 2 0.069
All 184.74 14 0
Employment (elderly males) Employment (youth) 22.585 2 0
School (youth) 4.3938 2 0.111
Employment (prime age) 14.617 2 0.001
Minimum wage 14.913 2 0.001
GDP per capita 1.8118 2 0.404
Wbar 7.3343 2 0.026
Wminpv 4.6874 2 0.096
All 67.96 14 0
Minimum wage Employment (youth) 21.025 2 0
School (youth) 3.2539 2 0.197
Employment (prime age) 20.69 2 0
Employment (elderly males) 3.5881 2 0.166
GDP per capita 7.14 2 0.028
Wbar 33.363 2 0
Wminpv 22.309 2 0
All 155.06 14 0
GDP per capita Employment (youth) 3.0733 2 0.215
School (youth) 1.7618 2 0.414
Employment (prime age) 5.4397 2 0.066
Employment (elderly males) 5.2948 2 0.071
Minimum wage 2.8439 2 0.241
Wbar 2.0804 2 0.353
Wminpv 1.2416 2 0.538
All 48.775 14 0Early Retirement and Employment of the Young in the Netherlands    2 5 7
Wbar Employment (youth) 12.351 2 0.002
School (youth) 1.3399 2 0.512
Employment (prime age) 0.02807 2 0.986
Employment (elderly males) 1.4233 2 0.491
Minimum wage 15.078 2 0.001
GDP per capita 6.485 2 0.039
Wminpv 2.124 2 0.346
All 67.719 14 0
Wminpv Employment (youth) 30.749 2 0
School (youth) 20.214 2 0
Employment (prime age) 24.462 2 0
Employment (elderly males) 0.72476 2 0.696
Minimum wage 24.757 2 0
GDP per capita 3.4185 2 0.181
Wbar 17.809 2 0
    All   66.617   14   0
8.7    Instrumental  Variable  Speciﬁ   cations
Table 8.4 presents four regressions. The ﬁ  rst two regressions simply regress 
(ﬁ  rst diﬀerences of) youth employment and youth unemployment on (ﬁ  rst 
diﬀerences of) employment of the elderly, similar to tables 8.1 and 8.2. We 
include GDP per capita as an additional control variable. The second two 
regressions use the same speciﬁ  cation but now use lagged variables of GDP 
per capita and of percent twenty to twenty-  four in school as instruments.
Table 8.3  (continued)
Equation   Excluded   chi2   df   Prob  chi2
Table 8.4  The eﬀects of elderly employment (ﬁ  rst diﬀerence speciﬁ  cation)
Explaining youth employment or unemployment













Emp(elderly males) 0.591 –0.557 1.140 –3.039
(0.163)∗∗∗ (0.356) (0.643) (1.884)
GDP per capita 2.54e-  06 –0.0000123 –0.0000103 0.0000435
(7.98e- 06) (0.0000175) (0.0000172) (0.0000503)
Constant 0.005 0.073 0.014 0.036
(0.005) (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.012) (0.034)
Observations 32 32 31 31
R2   0.39   0.15   0.15    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.258        Arie Kapteyn, Klaas de Vos, and Adriaan Kalwij
We note that the eﬀect of elderly employment on youth employment is 
signiﬁ  cant for ordinary least squares (OLS) and marginally signiﬁ  cant for 
instrumental variables (IV). For youth unemployment we ﬁ  nd marginally 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀects. In none of the cases do the signs of the elderly employ-
ment variable support the notion that reducing elderly employment will help 
to improve the chances of younger people in the labor market.
8.8      Discussion: Employment of the Young and the Inducement to Retire
In previous phases of the International Social Security (ISS) Project, we 
have shown that the incentives to retire play an important role in explain-
ing the LFP of the elderly. To check the direct eﬀect of these incentives on 
the employment and unemployment of the young, we would like to use 
some average measure of the incentives to retire as explanatory variables 
for explaining the employment or unemployment of the young. We ﬁ  nd that 
these incentive variables are plausibly Granger caused by youth unemploy-
ment, rather than the other way around. This is consistent with a descrip-
tion of the history of labor market policies in the eighties and nineties of 
the last century.
We do ﬁ  nd, however, that both in ordinary regressions and in IV regres-
sions employment of the elderly has a (marginally signiﬁ  cant) positive eﬀect 
on employment of the young and a negative eﬀect on unemployment of the 
young. This suggests that attempts to improve the labor market perspectives 
of the young by encouraging the elderly to leave the labor market are likely 
to be counterproductive (or at least not eﬀective). Altogether, we conﬁ  rm 
the suspicion of the originator of the “old for young” idea that the strong 
increase in early retirement has not had an appreciable positive eﬀect on the 
employment of the young.
Appendix
Incentives to retire have been approximated by considering a representative 
male elderly person who is aged a (between ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and sixty-  ﬁ  ve), mar-
ried, and a single earner, who worked at age ﬁ  fty- four with median earnings 
but was retired from the labor market in year t. Since the person was faced 
with the decision to retire from the labor force or not from age ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve until 
his actual retirement age, his incentive to retire is calculated as a weighted 
average of the incentive to retire at the respective ages between ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
and a, weighted with the proportion of persons still in employment. Next, 
a weighted average of these incentives (aggregating over all ages a between 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and sixty-  ﬁ  ve) is calculated where the weights are determined by the 
respective numbers of retired individuals with age ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve, ﬁ  fty- six, and so Early Retirement and Employment of the Young in the Netherlands    2 5 9
forth. In these calculations, early retirees are assumed to have been eligible 
for early retirement; and the disabled are assumed to have been eligible for 
disability beneﬁ  ts. Thus, the variables used are a weighted average of the 
incentive to retire via ER and DI, where the weights depend on age and year 
(since no exact information by year is available for the whole period, the 
gradual introduction of ER between 1974 and 1984 has been approximated). 
The incentives have been approximated from 1973 onward (with earliest 
retirees having retired in 1963; however, since the tax schedule before 1973 
is problematic, changes in the tax schedule between 1963 and 1973 have not 
been taken into account).
The incentive variables that we calculate in this way are wbar—a weighted 
average of the social security wealth of the retirees in question—as well as 
Wminpv, social security wealth minus the peak value, the highest obtain-
able SSW.
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